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Abstract—The proliferation of ubiquitous computing requires
energy-efficient as well as secure operation of modern processors.
Side channel attacks are becoming a critical threat to security
and privacy of devices embedded in modern computing infras-
tructures. Unintended information leakage via physical signatures
such as power consumption, electromagnetic emission (EM) and
execution time have emerged as a key security consideration for
SoCs. Also, information published on purpose at user privilege
level accessible through software interfaces results in software-
only attacks. In this paper, we used a supervised learning
based approach for inferring applications executing on android
platform based on features extracted from EM side-channel emis-
sions and software exposed dynamic voltage frequency scaling
(DVFS) states. We highlight the importance of machine learning
based approach in utilizing these multi-dimensional features on a
complex SoC, against profiling-based approaches. We also show
that learning the instantaneous frequency states polled from on-
board frequency driver (cpufreq) is adequate to identify a known
application and flag potentially malicious unknown application.
The experimental results on benchmarking applications running
on ARMv8 processor in Snapdragon 820 board demonstrates
early detection of these apps, and atleast 85% accuracy in
detecting unknown applications. Overall, the highlight is to utilize
a low-complexity path to application inference attacks through
learning instantaneous frequency states pattern of CPU core.
Index Terms—Application Inference, DVFS, EM Emissions,
Machine Learning, Side-Channel Attacks, SoC, Mobile Comput-
ing, Snapdragon, Spectral Features
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid proliferation of technology has resulted in large-
scale growth in the smart devices with tremendous computing
capabilities to form the interconnected network of things
(IoTs). These computing devices generate huge amounts of
data, which carry sensitive information like account details,
social security number, passwords, PIN etc. This sensitive data
is vulnerable to attacks that invade users privacy. To start
with, applications unintentionally installed on device can be
potential malware threats. Similarly, hijacking the control flow
at runtime targeted through software vulnerabilities to launch
attacks can trigger shell code. Application inferencing is yet
another possibility, wherein untrusted application can identify
activities on a device through eavesdropping software events
hiding in the background. These are few attack scenarios
prevalent in smartphones. To defend against these attacks,
an application or program profile should be generated. This
can be achieved using distinct signatures acquired through
numerous side-channel leakage sources. For instance, in hard-
Fig. 1. (a) Dynamic voltage frequency scaling algorithms can be a critical
side channel for analyzing program behavior, (b) hardware-software co-
optimization approach for power management in modern SoCs, and (c)
dynamic management of frequency (and voltage) under varying workloads
for a quad-core system.
ware, power, EM-emissions, timing and in software through
unintended published information from process logs [1]. It can
also be attained utilizing performance tools like perf in linux
based systems. Generally, profile generation can be based on
existing statistical models or it can be closely approximated
using supervised learning algorithms.
Profiling based side channel attacks comprise of Template
Attack (TA) or Stochastic Approach (SA). In profiling-based
side-channel attacks adversary models the leakage behavior
of device, and later infers secret based on these models.
Template attacks (TA) are a special class of profiling-based
attacks which are shown to recover cryptographic keys with
fewer traces in both hardware and software implementations
[2]. Similarly, templates based on software events have been
utilized to characterize applications executing on devices. But,
template attacks are effective approaches for well-understood
devices and its complexity increases for modern System on
Chips (SoCs) [3]. For instance, software events extrapo-
lated from high performance computing-performance monitors
(HPC-PM) vary from one kind of architecture to another due
to the variation in hardware organizations thereby requiring
knowledge of the architecture. To resolve this problem, ma-
chine learning approaches are a suggestive alternative to side
channel analysis. Given complex dataset, ML algorithms per-
form classification or prediction based on experience learned
from the examples. In contrast to TA, machine learning based
attacks are promising in black box settings, with only limited
understanding of the target implementation [3]. Authors in [4]
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have shown ML-based approach can be more successful than
TA, if proper algorithm and tuning parameters are selected.
Moreover, the problem of high dimensional side-channel traces
can be effectively managed with ML-based approaches than
TA, which are best model if fewer Points of Interest (POIs)
could be identified with most information [3]. Several works
utilizing ML models have shown to outperform profiling-
based attacks like TA. An attack targeting individual bits
of TripleDES using Random Forest (RF), Support Vector
Machines (SVM) and Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) has been
shown to outperform TA [5]. Similarly, Lerman et al. showed
an attack on AES with Rotating S-boxes Masking (RSM)
countermeasure using SVM and RF and it outperformed TA
and SA [6].
This paper focuses on performing application inferencing on
Snapdragon 820 Quad core processor based on ML models
which are trained on features extracted from side-channel
emissions of labelled dataset of applications(legitimate). Effect
of decision threshold of the trained model on accuracy of de-
tecting an application unknown to the model is also analyzed.
The classification accuracies are evaluated through supervised
learning models - K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), SVM and
RF. Also, this paper, experimentally studies the impact of
EM-emissions and for the first time DVFS as a source of
side-channel information leakage (Fig. 1). The paper makes
following key contributions:
• We develop supervised machine learning (ML) based
classification models to exploit the relationship between
time-varying EM-emissions and DVFS states with appli-
cations characteristics to identify applications running on
processor.
• We introduced transitions of DVFS states in time-domain
as a side channel information leakage path. We show that
change in DVFS states during an applications runtime can
be used to identify applications.
• We show that the developed models can be used to
classify known programs and detect unknown programs
at lower computational and memory cost, but requiring
more time compared to EM-based profiling.
We demonstrate the side-channel information leakage via
EM-emissions and DVFS through hardware measurements
on Snapdragon 820 development kit with ARMv8 processor
running Android benchmark applications. The experimental
results show close to 94%(EM) and 80%(DVFS) accuracy
in classifying known applications and over 85% accuracy in
detecting ’unknown’ applications.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Electromagnetic (EM) Side Channel
Side channel emissions originating as result of electromag-
netic radiations from device carry sensitive information about
data being processed. The rise of emissions is reflection of
sudden surge in current through power rails as CMOS devices
switch states and through interconnects and package. In the
past, emissions through EM side-channel are utilized for re-
vealing cryptographic keys based on correlation or differential
analysis models. Many other complex attacks models have also
shown to compromise security of wide domain of comput-
ing devices which includes smartphones, smart-cards, FPGA
and personal computers. In another setting, electromagnetic
emissions(EM) have shown to reveal information about kind
of program running on device or can be used as a defense
mechanism to identify malicious code, and even perform re-
verse engineering attacks. The existing approaches to EM side-
channel analysis requires physical access or close-proximity to
the device to measure time-dependent EM signature.
B. DVFS-based Power Management
The energy dissipation is a major constraint to IoT de-
vices; hence, processors for IoT/mobile platforms incorpo-
rates various dynamic power management mechanisms. In
particular, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS),
has become an integral part of modern processors to improve
energy efficiency, increase battery life, and manage thermal
effects. With DVFS, the supply voltage and operating fre-
quency are scaled with respect to varying workloads of the
target system. Significant efforts have been devoted in past
decades in developing DVFS algorithms. Moreover, to enhance
energy-efficiency of processors, there has been a constant
push to enable software-based DVFS control. Consequently,
modern processors have multiple embedded DVFS algorithms
available as drivers (referred to as the governors) that users
can exercise and monitor the voltage/frequency states of the
processors. Different DVFS algorithms are designed based on
certain policies like workload sampling interval, frequency
upscaling, and downscaling factors etc. The CPU utilization-
based decision to down-scale or up-scale frequency, is de-
pendent on busy time of CPU, which in turn is application
dependent. A skilled user can also implement their own DVFS
algorithms to augment/replace existing governors and control
the voltage/frequency states of the processors. Thus, in nutshell
frequency states of all cores are continuously updated by
cpufreq driver in Linux kernel and no special privileges are
required for user access. This DVFS frequency states creates
a software-based path to side-channel information leakage.
C. Related Work
Many of the past efforts have focused on EM based side-
channel analysis. Nazari et. al. and Callan et. al. presented
EM-based acquisition and analysis flow to detect code change
injected by an adversary [7], [8]. ML-models were used to
learn features extracted from power side channel emissions
to create a model for detecting malware in medical devices
[9]. Similarly, a security monitor for control flow integrity of
programs executing on industrial PLC has been demonstrated
using LSTM network based on features derived from EM-
emissions [10].
DVFS based power management has been explored ex-
tensively across all platforms but only recently researchers
have started exploring the interactions of DVFS and security
[11]–[14]. Yang et. al. has demonstrated use of DVFS as a
countermeasure to power side channel attack on encryption
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Fig. 2. Pre-processing and feature extraction from the raw measured traces for (a) DVFS and (b) EM signatures followed by building ML-based models and
validation.
engines [11]. More recently. A. Singh et. al. has demonstrated
use of fast DVFS enabled by on-chip regulator and adaptive
clocking to deter extraction of encryption key in hardware
accelerators [12], [13]. More recently, Tang et. al. presented a
CLKSCREW methodology which exploits the flaws in power
management techniques of an ARMv7 processor [14]. By
performing unconstrained overclocking/under-volting, authors
could inject faults during encryption and successfully recover
the secret key.
Both profiling based and ML based techniques have been
utilized for application inferencing. For instance, to protect the
devices against malwares, authors have demonstrated malware
detection based on HPCs by selectively choosing application
specific hardware and software events [15]. Similar approach,
is shown by R. Spritzer et.al. using selective information from
process logs that form a strong correlation for same application
in order to form templates and utilizing dynamic time warp-
ing(DTW) for application inference. They have shown upto
96% accuracy in identifying 100 android applications [16].
ML-based approaches have been used to identify malware
based on features extracted from power-emissions [11] and
HPCs [17]. Software exposed information can be used to
mount inference attacks. Using /proc/<pid>/statm along with
number of context switches, is shown to infer a visited-
webpages by a user [18]. Similarly, size of the memory
footprint of specific applications in /proc/<pid>/statm is used
to infer the user interface. More recently, activity transitions
of an application are inferred using runtime memory statistics.
[19] Moreover, identifying which application is running can
help in launching specific attacks. For instance, an app running
in the background to identify application which require login
credentials, can execute phishing-based attacks [19] to steal
login credentials.
III. METHODOLOGY
Our experimental setup includes a Quad-core Snapdragon
820 SoC which has 2 slowly clocked and 2 fast clocked Kyro
cores and hosts Android 7.0 Nougat OS. These cores form
two clusters and with respective DVFS states. Since, we are
profiling applications based on DVFS states running in multi-
core platform and power domains of these multi-cores are
different, an applications workload behavior might influence
the DVFS states of both the clusters. Therefore, DVFS states
is collected from both these clusters.
A. Model Building and Validation with Machine Learning
(ML) Algorithms
We have explored supervised machine learning models for
extracting features from time-series of DVFS states and EM-
signatures for applications inferencing. ML models that work
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Fig. 3. (a) Measurement Setup details to capture DVFS and EM-signatures (b) Open-Q APQ8096 System-on-Module development platform for characterization.
effectively for high-dimensional signatures derived from EM-
emissions have been realized in the past. Here, we analyze
ML model selectivity based on DVFS dataset. The learned
ML models are used to classify an application to one of the
known ones or as an unknown one. The details of our approach
are discussed below:
1) Training: : To build ML models for the program runtime
behavior using EM-emissions and DVFS states, multiple sig-
natures were captured for the same program to ensure enough
observations for each program to the effect of noise generated
by background activity. Number of records varies with each
observation as result of different polling delays. Therefore,
the measured traces are interpolated to have a uniform time
interval. The polling frequency encounters 0.5 ms delay, and
two clusters are simultaneously polled. The measured traces
are partitioned in train data and test data (75%/25%).
2) Feature Extraction: : For DVFS states, we used time-
series values as the features. For EM-side channel we used
spectral components. We capture two time-series correspond-
ing to two clusters for DVFS data. Instead of choosing the
exact frequency values, we chose frequency indexes (0 to 39)
to avoid need for normalization of data as some machine
learning algorithms (e.g., support vector machines) do not
perform well if the input data has large values. The frequency
range of core varies from 307200 to 1593600 KHz with
14 states in between for 2 cores, and 307200 to 2150400
KHz with 16 states in between for other 2 cores. We also
explored features extracted from frequency domain, which in
fact showed improved classification results. Frequency states
from both the cores are appended to form the feature vector.
Additionally, since number of time samples in the input
dataset are very large, we performed principal component
analysis (PCA) to bring down the dimensions within 660. PCA
reduces the dimensionality keeping the variance to as much as
possible to maximum. We have evaluated relation of Principal
Components required against variance in the dataset.
3) Machine Learning Algorithms: : To learn program run-
time characteristics from DVFS states, we chose supervised
machine learning algorithms suitable for varying type of
datasets. Both our training and testing datasets vary a lot in
terms of dimensionality, number of observations and noise
characteristics which in turn depend on the selected DVFS
governor, application that is being run, the sampling speed at
which the DVFS monitor is capturing the frequency states
and OS essential apps/services running in the background.
Here we describe the chosen algorithms and the reasons for
their selection and our expectation with respect to this specific
classification problem.
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN): KNN algorithm can classify
datasets with linear or non-linear distributions. It just assigns
labels to training examples without building any models. For
inference, it looks at the k nearest neighbors based on the
distance defined as a function of features. Both distance
metric and number of neighbors are input to the algorithm
and can be tuned for a given dataset. KNN performs well
with large number of observations in low-dimensional feature
space. Since, the effective dimensionality of our DVFS dataset
depends on the real-time workload conditions and the selected
DVFS governor, KNN is a good option for applications
having mostly constant workloads. However, KNN tends to
overfit with respect to noisy data or some bad features so its
performance may not be good in presence of lot of background
activity. In our experiment, we vary k from 1 to 20 to find the
optimal value. Our distance metric is Euclidean.
Support Vector Machines (SVM): Like KNN, SVM can also
classify linearly or non-linearly distributed datasets with a
proper kernel (linear, poly, radial basis function RBF). SVM
finds and hyperplane to separate out the given classes. SVM
can be tuned with respect to its parameters (C, Gamma) and
the type of kernel. For noisy as well as high-dimensional
data, SVM tends to outperform other ML algorithms. One
major drawback with SVM is its training runtime. To reduce
the training runtime, dimensionality reduction with principal
component analysis (PCA) is performed before model building
step. The DVFS frequency states have linear dependence on
the program workload conditions, therefore, a linear kernel
is expected to perform better for SVM based learning and
validation.
Random Forests: Random forest, being an ensemble learn-
ing algorithm (collection of several weak classifiers), performs
classification by using multiple randomized decision trees
(DT). Like SVM, they avoid overfitting with DT randomiza-
tion. However, unlike SVM which was mainly designed for
binary classification problems, Random forest applies to multi-
class problem, very useful for our 10-class datasets. Addi-
tionally, Random forest works with numerical and categorical
features suitable for our learning problems where features
are the frequency states. Due to randomization, we take the
average of 10 runs for random forest-based learning. In our
analysis we varied n estimators (an input to Random Forest
algorithm), from 10 to 100 and found the optimal to be 40.
TABLE I
HYPER-PARAMETERS TUNED/EXPLORED FOR MACHINE LEARNING
ALGORITHMS EMPLOYED IN THIS WORK
ML Algorithm Hyper parameters
KNN num neighbors=1 to 20
SVM C=1, Gamma=auto, linear kernel
RF num estimators=40
Table 1 lists the hyper-parameters chosen/tuned for our
experiments. We will discuss our findings with different ML
models in the results and analysis section. Both of our datasets
are noisy: DVFS traces are noisy because of background
activity and EM traces because of measurement, environment.
KNN tend to overfit in presence of noise while SVM performs
well.
B. Overall Approach
Fig. 2 describes the overall flow to monitor the DVFS
states and EM-emissions followed by subsequent analysis to
build machine learning models and classify known programs
and to detect unknown programs. The frequency states act as
unintentional source of information leakage from software and
are recorded using a script running in the background, that
reads current operating frequency of cluster from a cpufreq
file system.To avoid noise being generated from the other
cores, no other application is running in the background,
apart from essential system applications/services. Applications
running in parallel with profiled application will generate a
cumulative utilization pattern that distinctly dont represent
leakage from DVFS states of the profiled application. More-
over, performance critical application executing in parallel
can even mask the leakage of profiled application because of
substantial contribution to the overall utilization of the core.
Therefore, this methodology only profiles single application.
Algorithm 1: DVFS Monitoring Algorithm
pid ←− processID(pkgname(app))
state ←− read(/proc/pid/status)
while State(pid) is Running do
sTime ←− Time (currentTime)
frequency ←− read(/sys/devices/system/
cpu/cpuX/cpufreq/scaling cur freq)
eTime ←− Time (currentTime)
writeFile (sTime, eTime, frequency)
end
In Acquisition phase, benchmarks were executed, 40 traces for
each application were gathered for a runtime of 10 seconds. In
the next section, we will describe the experimental setup, post-
processing steps and explored machine learning algorithms in
more details.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION
A. Measurement Setup
An integrated mechanism to simultaneously capture DVFS
states and EM side channel signatures is developed, which
is followed by post-processing steps performed offline. The
Benchmarking APKs are installed on Snapdragon 820 devel-
opment kit assembled by Intrinsyc Open-Q 820 (APQ8096)
System on Module (SOM)[Figure 3(a,b)] which hosts an
Android (v7.0) OS. A separate LCD screen is installed for
user interface. The key components in the acquisition process
are detailed below
1) DVFS Trace Acquisition: : The interface between the
development kit and desktop is established through Android
Debug(ADB) Interface. Two separate compiled binaries for
polling the frequency states of individual core from cpufreq
files is loaded onto Android device using adb push com-
mand. An algorithm highlighting the steps included in DVFS
state monitoring script is shown in Algorithm 1. To success-
fully capture all frequency state transitions, polling frequency
should exceed frequency update rate in cpufreq module. Built-
in governor samples the workload in the order of (20-80) ms.
Total polling delay per acquisition is 0.5 ms. The applications
are profiled for duration of 10s.
2) EM Trace Acquisition: The DVFS states are monitored
and stored through a script. Hence, DVFS does not require any
additional acquisition instrument. However, EM-trace capture
has additional constraints for acquisition. An antenna-based
probe, which is used to capture these EM signatures has
to be carefully chosen. We have used a large loop antenna
probe (Beehive Corp., 1 tip diameter and 0.85 loop diameter,
50MHz 3dB bandwidth, 50 termination). Further, for EM-
trace, we set the sampling frequency at 2MHz to capture
10s long experiment. A finite buffer reading time is required
for oscilloscope capture which is included in shell script for
reliable EM-trace acquisition.
3) Trigger, Log and Fetch: : Trigger is required to syn-
chronize EM and DVFS measurements. A trigger signal is
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Fig. 4. Detection time for applications with (a) SVM inference model and (b) RF inference model using features from DVFS and EM side channel
generated from Arduino board which handshakes with script
running on PC. This trigger signal is used by oscilloscope
to capture and store the EM signature for each program.
Arduino sends an acknowledgement signal to PC when it
successfully receives command to generate trigger signal. On
receipt of Acknowledgement from Arduino, script on PC starts
the benchmarking application.
Once the application is triggered, the DVFS monitoring
script logs the frequency states and time stamp for observation
period of 10s. Finally, the log is saved onto the internal mem-
ory of the chip, and process is repeated until all applications
with multiple measurements are profiled. During the Fetch
phase, saved files are transferred from development kit to an
offline environment using adb pull command. This is followed
by pre-processing steps and Machine Learning training and
inference steps.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY FOR DVFS AND EM SIDE CHANNEL
DVFS/EM KNN SVM RF
DVFS (Time) 62.72 67.72 76.68
DVFS (Freq) 64.54 75.45 80.09
EM (Freq) 86.81 94.54 91.99
B. Application Classification
1) EM side-channel: Features extracted from EM side-
channel emissions are evaluated in frequency domain using
window-based FFT with 200 ms window (100 windows in
total) [Fig. 2(b)]. Since EM signatures are sampled at very
fast rate (2MS/s), we have 20 million-time samples (frequency
components in per EM signature). To reduce the dimension-
ality, window-based PCA is performed and 660 components
are retained in total (1-17 in each window). However, EM-
SCA is computationally more expensive as well as requires
large memory to perform PCA. Table 2 shows the EM-SCA
classification accuracies with all ML models. A comparatively
lower accuracy is observed with KNN. It is not optimal due
to noise in EM measurements coupled from multiple sources.
On the other hand, SVM and RF performs better but we do
not observe 100% accuracy with EM-emissions.
2) DVFS: Machine learning models are trained and val-
idated with DVFS signatures measured for all applications
(40 signatures per application, 880 signatures in total). The
measured data is divided into 660/220 signatures (75%/25%
split) for training and validation phases. Fig. 2(a) describes
the pre-processing steps needed to align the DVFS traces and
reduce dimensionality from 2 ∗ 104 to within 660 principal
components using principal component analysis. Feature Ex-
traction was performed on each window separately and finally
all features are combined to form a reduced dimension feature
vector. We have utilized both time-domain and frequency-
domain features for classifying applications. Table 2 shows
cumulative accuracies for test data with respect to 3 different
machine learning models (KNN, SVM and Random Forest).
In general, classification results based on frequency domain
features have higher accuracies in comparison to time-domain
features with all evaluated machine learning models. On
comparing classification accuracies with different ML models,
KNN does not perform optimal fitting. It can be concluded it
is no best algorithm when data is noisy, or features are not
consistent. But, SVM and RF performs better with the dataset,
showing 75.45% and 80.09% accuracy respectively.
C. Application Detection
Classification Accuracies is not the best metric for compar-
ing information leakage from DVFS and EM-SCA. Therefore,
we study the latency associated with detecting (classifying)
an application with DVFS signatures and compare that with
EM-SCA based detection. Detection latency is estimated us-
ing window-based classification of DVFS or EM signatures.
Window size is chosen based on CPU load evaluated by
the governor (order of milliseconds). Data is incremented in
steps of window size. As expected, the classification accuracy
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Fig. 5. Cumulative Detection time for all applications with SVM inference
model using EM-features and DVFS features from high performance, energy
efficient core.
improves as data from more number of windows are used
for classification. The time required for 80% classification for
each application is derived which is multiple of number of
windows. The steps involved in calculating detection time
is listed in Algorithm 2. The detection time for different
benchmark application based on Frequency domain EM-SCA
and DVFS is shown in Fig. 4(a,b). Cumulative classification
accuracies with KNN is lower in comparison to SVM and RF
as shown in Table 2,therefore detection time is evaluated using
these two ML algorithms.
1) EM side-channel: Fig. 4 depicts detection latency for
applications. Many applications show detection latency of 10s
which indicates failure in classifying particular application
with 100% confidence. As EM emissions integrate leakages
from multiple sources on-chip, which contributes to noise
and reduces EM signal, thereby selected features cannot be
segregated. The time-dependence of classification accuracy is
depicted in Fig. 5. It shows gradual increase in cumulative
accuracy with 80% accuracy achieved in 4s time.
2) DVFS: Application detection based on frequency do-
main DVFS signatures have experimentally shown lower de-
tection latency(average). Though some applications are clas-
sified faster compared to EM-SCA as shown in Fig. 4(a, b),
overall cumulative accuracy variation over time is slower as
shown in Fig5. We have analyzed the impact of selecting
features from multicore in comparison to single core through
classification accuracy or detection latency as shown in Fig. 5.
The detection time drops in case if features are extracted from
either energy-efficient or high-performance. Core migrations
effects can result in applications switching between cores
based on workload requirements of applications, therefore
multi-dimensional feature combined from both cores shows
improved classification as well as detection accuracies.
D. Detecting Unknown Applications
The ML models were trained to learn features of legitimate
applications installed on mobile device. This trained model
can be used to flag a potentially malicious or application not
known to user. The trained model with known applications
Algorithm 2: Application Detection
nApps : Number of applications
train size : Training data size
test size : Test data size
data : FFT (DVFS time series)
nWin : Number of windows
n components : Number of principal components
max detection time : Maximum detection time
forall apps do
forall nWin do
train data ←−data(nApps,train size,
min window size,windowNumber)
test data ←−data(nApps,test size,
min window size,windowNumber)
data ←− windowedPCA(train data, test data,
train label, test label, n components)
prediction scores ←− SVM (train data, test data,
hyperparamters, train labels, test labels)
accuracy[apps] ←− Time (prediction scores)
end
end
forall apps do
if accuracy[apps] greater or equals 80 then
index ←− FindIndex(accuracy[apps] equals 100)
detection time[apps] ←− index *
min window time
else
detection time[apps] ←− max detection time
end
end
dataset is applied to a test dataset of some of the unknown
applications.We have utilized MiBench applications for the
testing, with each program generating 40 signatures during
testing. To detect unknown class, we define a decision thresh-
old to classify the unseen data in the unknown program class
only when probability for all existing classes less than decision
threshold. The degradation in classification performance is
measured using precision [True Positives / (True Positives +
False Positives)] and recall [True Positives / (True Positives +
False Negatives)].
Fig. 6 shows that classification accuracy of unknown apps is
atleast 85% and 88% for DVFS and EM side channel respec-
tively evaluated with SVM and RF inference models. SVM
model shows higher accuracy for unknown application and
performs comparatively better with EM side channel features.
RF inference model on DVFS features of test set classify
unknown applications with 94% with known test accuracy re-
duced to 63% (more false negatives) at higher threshold values.
At lower threshold values, accuracy of unknown application
drops to 85% and 87% but at higher accuracy of known class
(lower false negatives).
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Fig. 6. Average Accuracy for Known and Unknown applications, at different
decision thresholds with SVM and RF trained model using EM-emissions and
DVFS spectral features.
V. CONCLUSION
This work experimentally demonstrated the feasibility of
identifying applications running on a device and detecting
unknown application with high accuracy utilizing a machine
learning based approach based on EM-side channel and soft-
ware exposed DVFS information on Snapdragon 820 proces-
sor. Although, impact of DVFS states on evading information
leakage or promoting other side-channels have been studied
in the past, we have shown that information harnessed from
these states is useful for identifying applications with less com-
plexity. The experimental results show unknown applications
can be identified with atleast 85% accuracy for maximum
achievable accuracy of 94% for known applications on the
analyzed dataset. Application specific DVFS features can
classify applications with 80% accuracy but cannot provide
better detection than EM-side channel features. On the other
hand, application inference using EM side-channel is more
computationally intensive and prone to measurement noise.
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